Farage’s Two-Week Pledge: How Reform UK Plans to ‘Stop the Boats’ and the Hurdles Ahead

We are the party on the rise,' Farage tells Reform supporters at conference  - BBC News

Reform UK leader Nigel Farage has doubled down on his pledge to halt small-boat Channel crossings within two weeks of gaining the legal powers to do so, after initially misspeaking about the timeline during his keynote speech at the NEC last Friday. Addressing an audience of 6,000 party members in Birmingham, Farage declared that a Reform UK government would “stop the boats” and “detain and deport those who illegally break into our country,” insisting the UK should adopt the same approach as “nearly every normal country around the rest of the world.”

During the rally, Farage committed to ending illegal arrivals within a fortnight of taking office. But in a later sit-down interview with GB News, the Clacton MP clarified that the two-week countdown would begin not from election day, but from the point at which new migration legislation receives Royal Assent. “Within two weeks of legislation being passed, we will stop the boats,” he told the broadcaster, signalling that Reform UK sees rapid law-making as central to its plan.

Farage also hinted that this legislation could be accelerated through Parliament, arguing that “given the mood of the nation, the legislation needs to go through as quickly as it’s possible.” His comments raise the question of what mechanisms a Reform UK government could use to deliver such drastic changes—and whether they would withstand parliamentary, legal, and international scrutiny.

Nigel Farage shifts on two-week small boats pledge


Fast-Track Lawmaking: Emergency Measures for a ‘National Emergency’

One of the key tools Farage could rely on is fast-tracked or emergency legislation. Parliament has used this process before, most notably during the Troubles, when urgent laws were passed within days. Farage has repeatedly described the small-boat crisis as a “national emergency,” positioning it in the same category as major security threats.

More than 30,000 migrants have crossed the Channel so far this year, and over 170,000 since 2018. The scale of crossings provides Farage with the political rationale to make the case for emergency powers. However, the procedure is traditionally reserved for fast-moving crises such as terrorism or war, and using it for migration would be controversial and likely contested.

Leaving the ECHR: A Referendum Farage Cannot AffordReform UK prepared to deport 600,000 under migration plans - BBC News

Another pillar of Reform UK’s asylum proposal—the plan to leave the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—poses its own complications. Opponents have called for a national referendum on withdrawing from the Strasbourg court, but time is precisely what Farage does not have. While referendums are baked into the political systems of Switzerland and the Republic of Ireland, the UK uses them rarely, and they take time to organise.

Recent examples illustrate this: the Alternative Vote referendum took nine months from legislation to polling day, while the Brexit referendum took around 60 weeks—after years of political preparation. For a government seeking rapid change, such delays could derail its plans before they begin.

Polling also presents a strategic obstacle. A recent YouGov survey shows 51% of Britons support remaining in the ECHR, with only 27% favouring withdrawal. For Farage, a referendum is not just too slow—it is far from a guaranteed victory. As a result, unilateral withdrawal becomes his only viable path, though it would invite intense domestic and international controversy.

Political and Legal Roadblocks in Parliament

Even with a large Reform UK majority in the House of Commons, the House of Lords could slow or obstruct Farage’s proposal. Reform UK has no peers in the upper chamber, making it likely that the Lords—typically more liberal on immigration issues—would challenge sweeping asylum reforms.

While the Salisbury Convention suggests the Lords should not block manifesto commitments, it has been inconsistently applied. Liberal Democrat peers, for example, opposed parts of the Labour government’s agenda in 2005, citing low turnout. Moreover, during Theresa May’s minority government in 2017, the Lords frequently intervened in Brexit-related legislation.

The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 allow the Commons to bypass the Lords after a delay, but even this process could trigger weeks or months of parliamentary “ping-pong,” slowing the reforms and creating openings for legal challenges.

And legal battles are almost guaranteed. Rishi Sunak, Farage’s predecessor in pursuing offshore asylum processing, faced major defeats in both the Supreme Court and the ECHR, which ultimately derailed his Rwanda plan. Farage’s even more ambitious proposals—deporting 600,000 migrants and negotiating a returns agreement with the Taliban—would almost certainly face challenges from human-rights lawyers, international courts, and refugee organisations.

A Pledge Under Pressure

Farage’s promise to end small-boat crossings within two weeks captures public attention, but achieving it would require unprecedented political speed, major constitutional changes, and an ability to withstand intense legal friction. Even with a supportive electorate and a strong Commons majority, Reform UK would face a legislative gauntlet, institutional resistance, and judicial scrutiny at every stage.

Whether the pledge is bold or unrealistic depends on one’s political point of view—but what is clear is that the obstacles between Farage and his two-week deadline are immense, complex, and far from guaranteed to fall.