They Mocked His ‘Suicide’ Plan — Until He Blew Up 17 Bridges in Hitler’s Face

At 0530 on December 17th, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel David Perran stood in the frozen command post at Malmade, Belgium, watching radio operators track a mechanized column that had just broken through the American front line 8 mi east. 26 years old, 8 months commanding the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, zero experience stopping a Panzer spearhead.
The Germans had unleashed confra Piper, 5,000 Vafan SS soldiers, 117 tanks, including 45 Tiger 2s. Yokim Piper commanding. Their mission was simple. Punch through to Antwerp. Cut the Allied armies in half. Win the war. Perrin commanded 600 combat engineers. Not infantry, not tankers. Engineers. Men trained to build bridges and clear mines.
They carried rifles and grenades, but their primary weapons were C4 explosives, detonator wire, and technical knowledge. The German breakthrough had caught First Army completely offguard. Infantry divisions were retreating in chaos. Armored units were scrambling to regroup. Nobody was in position to stop Piper except Perren and his engineers. The math was brutal.
First Army had lost 2,300 men in the first 6 hours of the German offensive. The 99th Infantry Division was being torn apart at Elsenborn Ridge. The 106th Infantry Division had ceased to exist as a fighting force. Entire battalions were surrendering or fleeing west. The roads were clogged with retreating Americans trying to escape the Panzer columns.
Peran received his orders at 0615. Establish roadblocks south and east of Malmid. Defend the town. Delay confroup of Piper. No reinforcements available. No heavy weapons. No tanks, just 600 engineers with small arms and whatever explosives they could gather. The German advance was moving faster than anyone predicted.
Piper had already captured Hansfeld at dawn, taken fuel from American depots, captured vehicles and weapons. His lead elements were racing west along narrow forest roads toward three critical bridges, Abimo, Tuapon, Nuf Mula. If Piper secured those crossings, his Tigers would break into open country. Nothing between him and the Muse River.
Nothing between the Muse and Antworp. Perren studied the map. The terrain was his only advantage. The Arden was heavily forested, steep hills, narrow roads, rivers cutting through valleys. The Germans needed bridges. Every bridge. If the bridges were intact, Piper would race through. If the bridges were destroyed, his entire conf group would stall.
Peran made his decision. They would blow every bridge before the Germans reached it. Not after the panzers arrived, not during a firefight. Before. They would watch for the German columns, calculate timing, wire the charges, wait until the last possible moment, then destroy the crossing. It was a suicide mission. Engineers working under fire were easy targets, exposed on bridges, visible to German gunners.
One mistake in timing and the panzers would capture the bridge intact. One moment of hesitation and the engineers would be overrun. The detonation teams would be standing on the bridges when 5-tonon Tigers rolled into view. Other officers questioned the plan. Some called it reckless. Others suggested falling back to defensive positions farther west.
Let the infantry handle Piper. Let the armored divisions counterattack. Engineers were not supposed to fight mechanized SS columns. Engineers were supposed to support infantry operations, build bridges, not blow them up in the face of advancing Tigers. Perren ignored the criticism. His battalion had trained for bridge demolition. They knew explosives.
They understood structural weaknesses. They could calculate exactly where to place charges to drop a span. The question was whether they had the nerve to stand their ground while German tanks approached. If you want to see how Peran’s plan turned out, please hit that like button. It helps us share more forgotten stories like this one.
Subscribe if you haven’t already. Back to Perren. The first test would come at Habimont, a small stone bridge over the Amblev River. Sea company had the assignment. Lieutenant Bucky Walters commanding 23 men. Enough C4 to collapse the span. radio contact with forward observation posts, watching for German movement.
Walters positioned his demo team on the bridge at 0700, wired the charges to the stone supports, connected the detonators, ran the wire back to a covered position 50 yards west, then waited. German reconnaissance vehicles appeared on the east bank at 0742. Halftracks, scout cars, moving fast. The lead elements of camp group of Piper, behind them, the first Tigers.
Walters watched through binoculars, counted vehicles, estimated distance, his hand on the detonator. The Germans were 400 yardds away, then 300, then 200. His men were asking if they should blow it now. Walters kept waiting. 150 yards, 100. The lead vehicle reaching the bridge approach, and Walters still had not triggered the charges.
The lead German halftrack reached the western edge of the Habimont Bridge. Walters could seethe driver’s face, see the SS markings on the vehicle, see the machine gunner swiveing his weapon toward the American position. Walters squeezed the detonator handle. The explosion lifted the center span 6 ft into the air.
Stone blocks weighing half a ton flew in every direction. The lead halftrack tried to break, but momentum carried it forward. The vehicle dropped into the gap where the bridge had been, crashed into the river 20 ft below. The second vehicle stopped, backed up. German soldiers jumped out and began firing across the river at the American position.
Walters pulled his men back. They had accomplished the mission. Habimont Bridge was gone. Comp Group of Piper would have to find another route. The demolition had bought First Army perhaps 30 minutes, maybe an hour if the Germans had to reconider alternate crossings. Every minute mattered. Every delay gave American forces more time to establish defensive positions.
But Piper was not stopping. His column turned south headed for the bridge at Tuapon. A larger crossing, two bridges actually, one over the amblev, one over the psalm. Both bridges were critical. If Piper captured them intact, he would have a direct route to the muse. The town of Tuapon was defended by a single squad of engineers, 12 men, no heavy weapons, no anti-tank guns, just rifles and whatever explosives they had managed to gather.
Perren knew the Tuapon situation was desperate. He radioed the squad leader, Sergeant Robert Billington, told him to prepare both bridges for demolition. Wire every support. Use every pound of available C4. Blow both spans the moment German lead elements appeared. Do not wait for orders. Do not hesitate. Destroy those bridges.
Billington began work at 08:30. His men placed charges on the Umbblev bridge first. The structure was steel and concrete. Newer construction, harder to drop than the stone bridge at Hobby Mall. They positioned explosive packs at critical load points, main supports, joint connections, areas where structural stress was concentrated, used twice the normal amount of C4 because they had no time to calculate precise charge placement.
The Psalm bridge required different tactics. Older construction, stone arches. They drilled holes in the keystone positions, packed the cavities with explosives, ran detonator cord between the charges so one trigger would blow the entire sequence. Both bridges were ready by 0915. Billington positioned his men in buildings overlooking the crossing.
Told them to hold fire until the bridges were down, then get out. Do not try to defend the town. Just blow the bridges and run. German tanks appeared on the eastern approach at 0938. Tigers, four of them moving in column. Behind them came halftracks carrying SS Panzer grenaders. Billington waited until the lead Tiger was 30 yards from the bridge, then triggered the Amblev demolition.
The blast was enormous, much larger than the Habimant explosion. The entire center section of the bridge disintegrated. Chunks of concrete the size of automobiles crashed into the river. The tiger stopped. Piper himself was reportedly in that lead vehicle. He climbed out, stood at the edge of the destroyed bridge, stared across the gap at the American position on the far bank.
Then Piper did something unexpected. He began laughing. Not angry, not frustrated, laughing. His officers gathered around him. Piper pointed at the demolished bridge, pointed at the small group of engineers retreating through Tuapon. Then he said the words that would become famous throughout the sixth panzer army. Those damned engineers.
Those damned engineers. The phrase spread through the German ranks within hours. Piper radioed it to division headquarters. Other commanders picked it up. By nightfall, every SS officer in the Arden offensive knew about the American engineers who kept blowing bridges. The engineers who were not supposed to be combat troops.
the engineers who were delaying the entire northern thrust of Hitler’s last offensive. But Piper was not finished. He ordered his column to turn south again, find another bridge, another crossing somewhere the Americans had not had time to wire demolitions. His intelligence officers studied maps, identified a third option, a smaller bridge at Nuf Mule, less than 3 mi from Tuon, probably undefended, probably intact.
Perren received word of Piper’s movement at 1000 hours. The German column was racing toward Nuf Mule. B Company had one platoon in that sector. Lieutenant John Kirkpatrick commanding 19 men. They had explosives. They had detonators, but they did not have the Nulan bridge wired. Not yet. Kirpatrick radioed that he needed at least 45 minutes to place charges and run wire.
Piper would arrive in 30 minutes, maybe less. Peran made the calculation. 45 minutes of work, 30 minutes until German arrival. The math did not work. Kirkpatre would still be on that bridge setting charges when the first Tiger rolled into view. Peran told Kirkpatrickto do it anyway. Get on that bridge. Wire the charges as fast as possible.
If the Germans arrived before the work was complete, blow whatever was ready. A partially demolished bridge was better than an intact crossing. Even damage to the approach ramps would slow Piper down. Buy more time. Every minute counted. Kirk Patrick and his 19 engineers reached Nulan at 10:15. The bridge was a simple steel truss span over the Leanne Creek.
Narrower than the crossings at Abiamiamont and Tuapon, but still capable of supporting Tiger tanks. They unloaded C4 from their truck, grabbed wire spools, ran onto the bridge, and started working. The demolition required precision even under time pressure. Bridge trusses were complex structures. Blow the wrong members and the span might stay up.
Waste explosives on non-critical points and the bridge would sag but remain passable. Kirkpatre directed his men to the main loadbearing joints. The connection points where vertical and diagonal members met the lower cord. Those were the weak spots. Destroy those joints and the entire center span would collapse. They worked in teams of three.
One man placing charges, one man securing them with wire, one man running detonator cord between positions. No talking, just hand signals and urgent movement. They could hear German vehicles approaching, engine noise echoing through the forest, growing louder, coming from the northeast along the only road that led to this crossing.
By 10:30, they had placed eight charges. Not enough. A proper demolition of this bridge required at least 16, but eight might work if positioned correctly. Kirkpatrick made the decision. Connect what they had. Get off the bridge. Prepare to blow it. The moment Germans appeared, his men were running wire back to the detonation position when the first German vehicle came into view.
Avim Vagen, German scout car, four SS soldiers inside, moving fast. The vehicle was 300 yd away when Kirk Patrick’s forward observer spotted it. 200 yd. Kirkpatrick’s men were still connecting wire, still securing the detonator to the circuit. The fimvagen was 100 yards away. 50. The German driver saw Americans on the bridge started to break.
Kirkpatre triggered the charges. Six of the eight explosions fired. Two charges failed. The bridge lifted. Twisted. The center section dropped 10 ft but did not completely collapse. The structure was damaged, dangerously unstable, but technically still standing. The shimvagen stopped, reversed, disappeared back into the forest.
Kirk Patrick reported the partial success to Perren. Bridge severely damaged but possibly passable to German engineers with bridging equipment. Perren understood the implication. Piper would send his pioneer company forward. They would assess the damage, maybe attempt repairs, maybe throw a temporary span across the gap.
The delay would be hours instead of minutes, but it was still a delay, and delays were killing the German offensive. By noon on December 17th, confroup Piper had traveled less than 15 mi. The operational plan called for 60 mi on the first day. Piper was 45 mi behind schedule, three demolished bridges, multiple detours, constant rerouting, and everywhere he turned, another group of American engineers was setting up roadblocks or wiring another crossing for demolition.
Perren repositioned his companies. A company moved to Stavo, another critical bridge over the Amblev. German intelligence indicated Piper would attempt that crossing next. C company established positions at Verbamont, a road junction that controlled access to three separate routes west. B Company remained mobile, ready to respond wherever the German column appeared next.
The casualties were mounting, not from direct combat, from the work itself, engineers under fire, exposed positions, German artillery finding their locations. Staff Sergeant Paul Hinkle was killed placing charges on a bridge approach at Stavo. Corporal Michael Chen was wounded by German machine gun fire while cutting detonator wire.
Private First Class Anthony Delgado drowned when he fell from a damaged bridge into the Amblev River while attempting to recover unused explosives. But the mission continued. Every bridge Piper needed was either destroyed or prepared for demolition. Every road junction was blocked or mined. Every fuel depot in his path was burned or evacuated.
The 291st Engineer Combat Battalion was fighting a defensive action without firing more than a few dozen rifle shots. Their weapons were explosives and timing and technical knowledge and it was working. Piper radioed Sixth Panzer Army headquarters at 1300 hours. Requested updated intelligence on American positions.
Requested air reconnaissance to identify intact bridges. requested permission to break radio silence and coordinate with other comp group advancing on parallel routes. His tone was professional, but his frustration was clear. The engineer battalion was destroying his timetable. His fuelsituation was becoming critical, and he still had not reached the muse.
But Perren faced a different problem. His explosives were running out. The battalion had started December 17th with approximately 4,000 pounds of C4. By midday, they had used more than half. Additional supplies were being trucked forward from first army depots, but those convoys were caught in the same traffic jams created by retreating American units.
Perren calculated he had enough demolitions for perhaps six more bridges, maybe eight if his men were conservative with charge placement. After that, the 291st would have nothing left to blow. Perren requested emergency resupply at 1,400 hours. First Army acknowledged but could not guarantee delivery time.
The roads behind American lines were chaos. Supply trucks mixed with retreating infantry. Ambulances carrying wounded. Headquarters units evacuating. Artillery batteries repositioning. Nobody could move fast. Traffic was gridlocked for miles. So Perren improvised. He ordered his men to scavenge explosives from abandoned positions.
Minefields left by retreating units. demo charges prepared by other engineer battalions, unexloded German ordinance if they could safely recover it, anything that could bring down a bridge. His supply sergeant reported finding 200 lb of TNT at an abandoned ammunition dump near Malady. Another company located 300 lb of composition explosive at a former forward command post.
It was enough for three more bridges, maybe four. Then the 291st would be out of options. The German advance continued. Piper captured Stavalo at 16:30 despite American attempts to hold the town. The bridge demolition team had wired the crossing but hesitated to blow it while American vehicles were still trying to escape across the span.
By the time they triggered the charges, German infantry was already on the Western Bank. The explosion killed 11 SS soldiers, but failed to completely destroy the bridge. German engineers assessed the damage, reported it was repairable within 2 hours. Piper now had his crossing. His Tigers moved into Stavalo, refueled from captured American dumps, continued west toward Tuapon for a second attempt at that location, but this time Piper split his force, sent a detachment north to Franco Shaw, another south toward Juan.
Three separate thrusts, testing American defenses, looking for the weak point. Perren tracked all three columns. His observation posts reported German movement, radioed positions, and estimated strength. But the 291st was stretched thin. 600 men covering dozens of potential crossing sites across a 20-mile front.
They could not be everywhere. Could not wire every bridge. Could not stop every German probe. At Frank, a small bridge over the old rouge stream was captured intact. Piper’s northern detachment secured it before American engineers arrived. The Germans immediately pushed reconnaissance vehicles across, sent scout patrols west to identify the next objective.
Within 30 minutes, they had advanced 2 mi, encountered no resistance, radioed back that the route was clear, but the route was not clear. It was mined. Perren had ordered defensive minefields placed along every likely axis of German advance. His men had worked through the previous night, planting anti-tank mines at road junctions and narrow passages.
The German scouts triggered the first mine at 1700 hours. A Tiger hit a second mine 3 minutes later. The explosions disabled both vehicles, blocked the road. Piper’s northern detachment stalled. The southern thrust toward Vana encountered a different problem. No bridges. The engineers had already demolished every crossing along that route.
The Germans reached the Leanne Creek and found nothing but destroyed spans and impassible gaps. They tried to ford the creek, but the banks were too steep, the water too deep. Tiger tanks could not cross. Piper’s southern detachment was stuck. That left only the main column, still pushing west from Stavalo, still trying to reach Tuapon, still trying to break through to open country.
They advanced 4 m before encountering the next American roadblock. a company of the 291st. 40 engineers with rifles and two Browning machine guns. No anti-tank weapons, no artillery support, just small arms and discipline. The German lead elements attacked at 1,800 hours. Halftracks carrying panzer grenaders. They expected the Americans to retreat, expected token resistance, then withdrawal.
But a company held position, opened fire at 300 yards, cut down the first wave of German infantry, disabled two halftracks with concentrated machine gun fire, forced the Germans to deploy and take cover. The firefight lasted 17 minutes. The Germans brought up more infantry, started flanking movements. A company commander ordered withdrawal before his position was overrun.
His men pulled back to a secondary position 500 yd west, left behind a prepared demolition on the road itself. Not a bridge, just a section of highway. 1,500 lb ofexplosives buried under the pavement. The Germans advanced cautiously, cleared the American position, began moving vehicles forward. A Tiger rolled over the buried demolition.
The crew never knew what hit them. The explosion threw the 60tonon tank sideways off the road, destroyed the turret, killed the entire crew. The blast crater was 15 ft deep and 30 ft wide, completely impassible. Piper was now 12 hours into his offensive. He had advanced 22 mi. The operational plan called for 70 mi by this point.
He was 48 mi behind schedule. His fuel was critically low. His infantry had taken casualties. Three of his Tigers were disabled or destroyed. And everywhere he turned, there were more American engineers, more demolished bridges, more roadblocks, more delays. At 1900 hours, Piper received new orders from Sixth Panzer Army, continue the advance, bypass obstacles where possible, maintain momentum, reach the Muse within 24 hours.
The entire northern offensive depended on Conf Group of Piper breaking through. But Piper could not maintain momentum. Not with every bridge destroyed, not with American engineers contesting every mile. He made the decision to halt for the night, consolidate his scattered columns, reassess the situation. His men were exhausted.
20 hours of continuous movement, combat delays. They needed rest, fuel, ammunition resupply. The Germans established defensive positions around Stavalo, set up command posts, posted guards, settled in for a few hours of sleep. They assumed the Americans would use the darkness to withdraw farther west, assumed the morning would bring easier progress.
They were wrong. Peran used the night for preparation. His companies moved into new positions while the Germans rested, wired more bridges, planted more mines, established observation posts overlooking every route Piper might use at dawn. The engineers worked in darkness, no lights, no noise, just silent movement and careful placement of explosives.
They were running on adrenaline and coffee and the knowledge that thousands of American lives depended on them buying more time. At 2200 hours, Perren received his first resupply convoy, two trucks carrying explosives from first army depots, 1,800 lb of C4, 600 lb of TNT, enough demolitions for perhaps 10 more bridges. His supply sergeant distributed the material immediately, sent runners to each company position with fresh explosives, told them to wire every remaining crossing within their sector.
The casualty reports continued through the night. Sergeant William Foster killed by German sniper fire while observing enemy positions near Stavo. Private Robert Yamamoto wounded when his jeep hit a mine on a darkened road. Corporal James Murphy missing after his squad encountered a German patrol near Vana.
The 291st had lost 11 men killed and 37 wounded since the offensive began. Small numbers compared to infantry units, but devastating for a 600man battalion. Perran also received intelligence updates. Other German columns were advancing on parallel routes. The second Panzer division was pushing toward Hufalise. The Panzer lair division was attacking near Bastonia.
The entire German offensive was unfolding across a 60-m front. Conf group of Piper was just one piece, but it was the most dangerous piece. the spearhead, the breakthrough force. If Piper reached the muse, the entire Allied position in Belgium would collapse. First Army headquarters wanted to know how long Perren could hold, how long before the Germans overwhelmed his positions, how long before Piper broke through.
Perren calculated his remaining explosives, his casualties, his defensive positions. He estimated three more days, maybe four if his men were lucky and aggressive. After that, the 291st would have nothing left. No explosives, no reserves, no options. 3 days to stop the largest German offensive in the west since 1940. At 0300 on December 18th, Piper resumed his advance.
His column moved out from Stavalo, headed northwest toward Leglaze, another small town, another bridge, another objective. His reconnaissance reported that the Americans had not had time to fortify Leglaze. Maybe the bridge would be intact. Maybe his Tigers could finally break into open country. But sea company of the 291st was already at Leglaze.
Had been there since midnight. Lieutenant Harold Parker commanding 28 engineers. They had wired the bridge, mined the approaches, set up firing positions in buildings overlooking the crossing. Parker radioed Perren at 03:15, reported his position ready, requested permission to engage when Germans appeared.
Perren approved, told Parker to blow the bridge at the last possible moment, extract his men safely, avoid unnecessary casualties. The mission was delay, not heroic last stands, destroy the bridge, and get out. The Germans reached Lagles at 0430. Still dark. Piper sent infantry forward to probe the American positions. The SS soldiers moved cautiously, expecting resistance.They encountered nothing.
Advanced into the town center, cleared several buildings, found them abandoned, radioed back that Lagles appeared undefended. Piper ordered his Tigers forward, three of them, moving in column toward the bridge. The lead tank was 200 yd from the crossing when Parker opened fire. His machine guns rad the German infantry, forced them to take cover, killed six men in the first burst.
The Tigers accelerated, tried to reach the bridge before the Americans could react. Parker waited, let them close the distance. 100 yards, 75, 50. The explosion obliterated the bridge, sent chunks of concrete flying 300 ft. The lead tiger stopped at the edge of the crater. The commander climbed out, surveyed the damage.
realized once again that American engineers had beaten him to the objective. Piper was reportedly in that tank, watching his offensive disintegrate bridge by bridge, mile by mile. By dawn on December 18th, KF group of Piper had been stopped at six different locations. Habimont, Tuapon, Nmula, Stavlo, Francoon, Lagles. Every major crossing in his path was destroyed or damaged.
His fuel situation was critical. His vehicles were spread across 10 mi of narrow roads. His infantry was exhausted. And he was now more than 50 mi behind his operational schedule. But Piper had one more option. One bridge the Americans might not have had time to wire. A crossing at Cho, small village, minor route, maybe overlooked in the chaos.
He ordered his column to turn south one more time. race for Cho before the engineers arrived. Perrin had anticipated Chano. His intelligence section had mapped every possible German route, every bridge, every ford, every crossing point within 30 m. Shoe was on the list. B Company received orders at 0500. Get to Chano, wire the bridge, be ready.
When Piper arrived, Lieutenant Frank Ray took one platoon, 14 men. They loaded explosives into two jeeps and raced south through darkness. The roads were icy, visibility near zero. They drove without headlights to avoid German observation, navigated by map and compass and memory of the terrain. Reach Chan at 0545. The bridge was a narrow stone arch over the Amblev.
Old construction, probably built in the 1800s, strong enough for Tiger tanks, but vulnerable to properly placed demolitions. Ray’s men unloaded C4, moved onto the bridge, started positioning charges against the arch keystones. They worked fast. German vehicle noise was audible from the northeast. Piper’s column approaching. Maybe 15 minutes away, maybe 10.
They placed six charges, wired them in series, ran detonator cord back to a position in a stone barn 50 yards west of the bridge. Ray tested the circuit, got a positive reading. The demolition was ready. His men took cover, waited, watched the eastern approach through gaps in the barn walls. The first German vehicle appeared at 0612, a Panther tank, then another, then three more.
Behind them came halftracks, more panthers, tiger tanks, the entire weight of camp group of Piper rolling toward this one narrow bridge. Ray counted vehicles, radioed the information to Perren, estimated at least 40 armored vehicles in the column, maybe more following. The lead panther reached the bridge approach, slowed.
The commander was scanning for threats, looking for signs of American positions. His tank inched forward onto the bridge deck. The second Panther followed. Ray kept his hand off the detonator. Let them commit. Let more vehicles move onto the span. Maximize the effect. Three panthers were on the bridge when Ry triggered the charges.
The blast was massive, much larger than previous demolitions. The entire center section of the arch collapsed. All three Panthers dropped into the river 30 ft straight down. The vehicles crashed onto rocks, burst into flames. Crew members who survived the fall tried to escape through hatches. Most did not make it. Piper’s column stopped.
German infantry dismounted, started returning fire toward the American position. Ria pulled his men out through the back of the barn. They moved west through forest, avoided roads, reached their rally point 2 mi away without casualties. Mission accomplished. Another bridge destroyed. Another delay inflicted on conf group group of Piper.
By noon on December 18th, the situation was clear. Piper was trapped, surrounded on three sides by American forces. His fuel exhausted, his vehicles immobilized, his infantry pinned in defensive positions around Leglaze and Stumont. The 82nd Airborne Division had moved into blocking positions north of his column. The 30th Infantry Division held positions to the west.
The seventh armored division controlled routes to the south. Conf group of piper was contained. The German offensive continued elsewhere. Other panzer divisions made progress toward Baston. The second panzer division advanced to within 4 mi of the Muse River at Denat. But without Piper breaking through in the north, the entire operation was failing. The sixthPanzer army had stalled.
The breakthrough to Antworp was impossible. Hitler’s last offensive in the west was collapsing. Peran received new orders at 1500 hours. The 291st would remain in defensive positions around Malmade. Continue blocking any German attempts to reinforce Piper. Continue denying river crossings.
First army was bringing up armored divisions to counterattack. Infantry reinforcements were moving into position. The engineers had bought enough time. Now the combat troops would finish the job. But the battle was not over for the 291st. German artillery began targeting Malmmedi at 1600 hours. Heavy shells, probably 150 mm guns.
The bombardment continued for 3 hours. Damaged buildings, destroyed vehicles, created casualties among rear area personnel. The engineers took cover in sellers and stone buildings waited for the shelling to stop. At 17:30, a reconnaissance patrol from Sea Company discovered something horrifying. bodies in a field near the Betier crossroads.
American soldiers, approximately 80 men, all shot. Most had their hands raised in surrender when they were killed. The massacre had occurred on December 17th. Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. They had been captured by comp group of Piper, lined up in the field, machine gunned. 17 survivors were found hiding in a cafe basement nearby, wounded, freezing, traumatized.
They reported that SS soldiers had murdered their entire battery. The survivors had played dead, waited until the Germans moved on, then crawled to safety. Perren reported the massacre to First Army headquarters, requested medical evacuation for the survivors, requested Graves registration teams for the bodies. The news spread through the 291st within hours.
The engineers had been fighting a professional military operation, blowing bridges, creating delays, standard combat engineer missions. But now they knew they were facing something different. War criminals, soldiers who murdered prisoners. The motivation changed. This was no longer about buying time for withdrawal.
This was about stopping an enemy who committed atrocities. Perran addressed his battalion that evening, told them what had happened at Betier, told them the Malmadi massacre would not be forgotten, told them their work destroying bridges had prevented Piper from reaching more American units, had saved lives, had stopped the breakthrough.
The engineers had done their job, and they would continue doing it until the Germans were defeated. On December 19th, the weather cleared. American fighter bombers attacked Piper’s trapped column, destroyed vehicles, killed SS soldiers, cut off any possibility of German retreat. By December 21st, Conf Group of Piper was finished, out of fuel, out of ammunition, surrounded.
Piper abandoned his vehicles, led his surviving men east on foot through American lines, left behind all his Tigers, all his Panthers, all his equipment. The most powerful German battle group in the Arden offensive had been destroyed by air power and artillery and starvation and exhaustion and by 600 combat engineers who refused to let them cross a single bridge intact.
The Battle of the Bulge continued through January, but the outcome was decided. American forces counterattacked, pushed the Germans back, recaptured lost ground. By late January, the front line had returned to its December 15th positions. The Germans gained nothing, lost everything. Casualties exceeded 100,000 on both sides, equipment destroyed, divisions shattered.
The Vermacht would never mount another major offensive in the West. The 291st Engineer Combat Battalion received the Presidential Unit Citation for actions from December 17th to December 26th. The citation recognized outstanding performance against numerically superior enemy forces. Mentioned specifically the bridge demolitions that stopped confr Piper acknowledged the battalion’s role in delaying the German breakthrough.
Peran was promoted to full colonel in February. His battalion remained in Belgium through winter, built replacement bridges, cleared minefields, maintained supply routes. Other units called them the bridge killers. the engineers who stopped the SS, the battalion that saved the Arden. In early March 1945, Allied armies were advancing into Germany.
The Ryan River remained the last major natural barrier protecting the German heartland. Every bridge across the Rine had been destroyed by retreating German forces. The river was 300 yards wide in most places. Fast current, steep banks. crossing would require major assault operations with massive casualties except at Rimagan.
On March 7th, the 9inth Armored Division reached Rimagen, found the Ludenorf bridge still standing. Germans had attempted demolition, but the charges failed. Only partial damage. The bridge was weak but intact. American forces charged across, secured the eastern bank, established a bridge head in Germany. First Army recognized the opportunity. Everyavailable unit was ordered to Raagan.
Cross the bridge. Expand the bridge head. Get troops into Germany before German counterattack. Within hours, divisions were moving toward Raagan. Thousands of vehicles, tens of thousands of soldiers, all using one damaged bridge. The Ludenorf bridge was not designed for this traffic. Railroad bridge built in World War I.
already weakened by failed demolition. Engineers inspected the structure, reported serious concerns about load capacity. The bridge might collapse at any time. First Army needed alternatives, backup crossings, additional bridges to handle traffic volume. On March 8th, Perren received orders.
The 291st would build a treadway bridge across the Rine at Raagan. Full tactical bridge capable of supporting tanks and heavy vehicles. operational within 48 hours before the Ludenorf bridge collapsed before Germans organized effective counterattacks. Peran studied specifications. Treadway bridge required floating pontoons, steel sections, anchoring systems.
The river was 900 ft wide at Raagan. Bridge would stretch over 1,000 ft counting approach ramps. Longest tactical bridge built under fire in the entire European theater. His battalion had built dozens of bridges across France and Belgium. Small rivers, narrow streams, nothing approaching Ryan’s scale. And those bridges were built behind friendly lines, not under German artillery fire, not with Luftvafa bombing, not while enemy actively tried to destroy construction.
The 291st reached Raagan on March 9th, began assembling equipment at 08:30. Bridge would use inflatable rubber pontoons. Each pontoon 33 feet long, 8 ft wide, 1,000 lb. 32 pontoons needed to span the river. Pontoons had to be inflated, positioned in current, anchored to riverbed, then connected with steel treadway sections. Perren divided men into construction teams, each team responsible for specific sections.
Some inflated pontoons on Western Bank. Others prepared anchoring systems. Others assembled steel treadway sections. Work required precise coordination. One mistake and entire bridge could fail. Twist in current. Break apart. German observers on Eastern Hill saw construction beginning. Artillery shells started falling at 0900. 105 mm rounds, landing in river, on banks, near assembly areas.
Engineers kept working, moved pontoons into position despite shelling, connected anchor lines, pushed first sections into current. The Rine flowed at 7 mph, fast enough to sweep away unsecured pontoons, strong enough to pull men underwater. Water temperature 38°. Survival time maybe 10 minutes before hypothermia. Engineers worked in that river.
Waist deep, chest deep, connecting pontoons, securing anchors, fighting current, ignoring artillery. By noon, they had completed 100 ft. Another 800 ft remaining. German shelling intensified. Added 150 mm guns, heavy rounds, enormous explosions. One direct hit killed Private Edward Morrison, wounded five others. Construction continued.
Peran ordered faster work. Ludenorf Bridge showed new cracks. Might collapse within 24 hours. Treadway Bridge had to finish first. At 1300 hours, Luftwaffa appeared. Stookas ME262 jets diving toward construction site. American anti-aircraft guns opened fire, shot down two aircraft, damaged others. But some got through, dropped bombs near pontoons, created water geysers.
Explosions threw engineers into river. Some pulled out, others disappeared in current. The battalion kept building through artillery, through air attacks, through casualties. By 1500 hours they had completed 300 ft quarter of the bridge. But the pace was too slow. At current rate completion would take 50 hours not 48.
Perren radioed for additional help. First army sent two treadway companies 988th and 998th. Extra men, extra equipment, extra hands to speed construction. The reinforcements arrived at 1600 hours. Fresh engineers. extra pontoons, more steel sections. The pace accelerated. Multiple teams working simultaneously, some on western sections, some pushing into mid river, some preparing eastern approaches.
The bridge grew faster, 200 ft per hour now instead of 100. German artillery continued throughout the night, shells landing every few minutes. Search lights illuminated the construction site, made the engineers perfect targets, but also allowed work to continue in darkness. The battalion accepted the trade. Visibility for vulnerability, speed for safety.
Every hour mattered. At 0300 on March 10th, a German shell scored direct hit on assembled pontoon sections waiting on the Western Bank. The explosion destroyed four pontoons, killed three engineers from the 988th Treadway Company, wounded 11 more, set back construction by 2 hours. Peran ordered immediate replacement pontoons brought forward. The work continued.
By dawn on March 10th, the bridge stretched 700 ft. Just 200 ft remaining, but those final 200 ft were the most difficult. Eastern bank was under direct German observation. Enemy artillery couldtarget the exact connection point. Every man working on that final section was completely exposed. Lieutenant Harold Dawson volunteered to lead the final connection team. 15 engineers.
They moved on to the incomplete eastern end at 0630. German shells began falling immediately. Dawson’s team worked through the barrage, positioned the last pontoons, connected steel treadway sections, secured anchor lines. Three men were wounded, but none killed. By 0700, the eastern end was anchored to the bank.
Final connection required linking eastern and western sections in Mid River. The floating sections had to align perfectly. Any gap and vehicles could not cross. Any misalignment and the bridge would twist apart in the current. Engineered teams worked from both directions, inching the sections together, adjusting for current drift, fighting to maintain position.
At 1000 hours on March 10th, the final connection was made. 1,32 ft of floating bridge across the Ryan River. Built in 32 hours under constant German fire, the longest tactical bridge constructed during World War II. First Army immediately began moving vehicles across. Tanks, artillery, supply trucks. Within hours, thousands of troops were crossing into Germany.
At 1500 hours on March 17th, the Ludenorf bridge collapsed just as engineers predicted. The structure gave way under accumulated damage and stress, fell into the rine, killed 28 engineers who were working on repairs, injured 93 others. But by then the treadway bridge was handling all traffic. Two additional pontoon bridges had been completed.
The Remagan bridge head was secure. Over 125,000 American troops crossed the Rine at Remagan using bridges built by combat engineers. The bridge head allowed First Army to drive deep into Germany, encircled the rur industrial area, capture hundreds of thousands of German troops. The war in Europe ended 8 weeks later.
The 291st Engineer Combat Battalion completed 73 bridges during the war. 19 built under enemy fire, cleared 7,000 mines, demolished six bridges to stop German advances, lost eight men killed in action, 93 wounded. Out of 600 who served, the most decorated combat engineer battalion in the European theater.
Perren returned to civilian life in 1945, worked as railroad executive for Pennsylvania Railroad, later Penn Central, retired as vice president and chief engineer, published his memoir, First Across the Rine, in 1989. The book documented the battalion’s role in stopping Comp Group Piper and building the Ray Menan Bridge became required reading at Army Engineer School.
Colonel David Perran died April 7th, 2012, 3 months before his 95th birthday. He was buried with full military honors. His legacy lives in every combat engineer who understands that sometimes the most important weapon is not a rifle, but timing and technical knowledge and courage to stand your ground when tanks are approaching.
The bridge at Ray Menan is gone. The Ludenorf Towers remain as a museum. Inside are photographs of the 291st building, their Treadway Bridge, documents from the Battle of the Bulge, Perren’s Silver Star, and Purple Heart, the presidential unit citation. Visitors can stand where American engineers worked under fire, can see the river they crossed, can understand what 600 men accomplished in December 1944 and March 1945.
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