Refusing to Kill in Nazi Germany: What Really Happened to Those Who Said “No”?

A common belief about the German military and police forces during the Second World War is that disobeying orders—especially refusing commands to kill civilians—meant instant death. Many soldiers assumed that questioning a superior’s directive, let alone resisting it, could result in execution, imprisonment, or repercussions for their families. For decades, this notion shaped historical understanding of obedience in Nazi Germany.

Yet detailed research suggests a more complex reality. Historian David Kitterman examined postwar investigations and trial transcripts preserved in German archives and in the Central Office for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg. His work uncovered at least eighty-five verifiable instances in which members of the Wehrmacht, SS, SD, Order Police, and even the Einsatzgruppen refused to participate in the murder of civilians or prisoners. Contrary to popular belief, none of these individuals were executed for their refusal, and more than half experienced no significant punishment at all.

One of the most striking examples is that of Dr. Albert Battel, a Wehrmacht reserve major and lawyer. In July 1942, as the SS prepared to carry out mass deportations—and killings—in the Polish city of Przemyśl, Battel used his authority to protect Jewish workers employed by the German Army. After persuading his superior to issue an order placing these workers under military custody, he went further: he blocked the SS from entering the city by raising bridges and transferred around 80–100 Jews to army headquarters for protection. Though this delay did not prevent later deportations, it momentarily saved lives. Battel was reprimanded and transferred to a front-line unit, and Himmler reportedly intended to arrest him after the war, but he survived and was later honored by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among the Nations.

Another officer, Bernhard Griese of the Schutzpolizei, evaded participation in mass shootings by insisting that all orders pass through formal channels. When an SD officer tried to recruit his men for an execution of Jewish civilians near Georgenburg, Griese refused and sought written confirmation from higher command that only officially transmitted orders were valid. His obstruction forced the SD to carry out the killing alone. Although the SS opened an inquiry, it was ultimately dropped, and Griese even received the Knight’s Cross soon afterward—an extraordinary outcome for someone who had directly declined involvement in mass murder.

Refusal occurred even within the Waffen-SS. In the summer of 1941, shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Second Lieutenant Schreiber reported to his commander, Friedrich Dern, that he and his men had been compelled to take part in executions of Jews and Poles. Schreiber declared he would not participate again. Dern supported him, informing SS command in Berlin that his battalion would not serve as an execution squad. The unit was dissolved, but Dern and Schreiber faced no severe repercussions; in fact, Dern continued to rise within the SS hierarchy.

Not all cases ended so lightly. Dr. Nikolaus Ernst Franz Hornig, a Wehrmacht first lieutenant, refused in November 1941 to execute 780 Soviet POWs. A lawyer and a Catholic, Hornig told his commander that the killings were illegal and immoral. None of his men joined the shooting. For this, he was arrested months later—not for the refusal itself, but for “undermining military morale” by teaching his soldiers that unlawful orders could be rejected. He spent the remainder of the war in Buchenwald, though he retained his rank, pay, and comparatively privileged status because his confinement was classified as “investigative custody.”

Kitterman’s research shows that motives varied. Some individuals cited conscience or religious beliefs; others appealed to military law, international conventions, or their own psychological distress. Officers were more successful in resisting, partly due to their better understanding of regulations and bureaucratic procedures. Some soldiers requested transfers; others pretended illness or incompetence; a few quietly evaded participation by missing shots or disappearing during executions.

The consequences also varied widely. Most refusers received nothing more than mild reprimands or reassignment. A handful were sent to front-line combat. Only one documented case involved a concentration-camp imprisonment—and as noted, that punishment was for spreading the idea that illegal orders could be disobeyed.

Stories of soldiers allegedly executed for refusal, such as Josef Schulz or Otto Schimek, have become symbols of resistance but remain historically uncertain due to limited documentation. They stand in contrast to the verified cases in which refusal did not lead to death.

This evidence challenges long-held assumptions about Nazi Germany’s systems of coercion. While the regime was unquestionably brutal, these cases reveal that individuals within its machinery of violence could— and sometimes did—choose not to kill, often without paying with their lives.