What Did General Patton Mean When He Said “We Defeated the Wrong Enemy”?

General George S. Patton’s postwar writings and remarks have long fueled debate about what he truly meant when he suggested that the United States had “defeated the wrong enemy” at the end of World War II. While his comment has been misused by extremists and misrepresented in fringe circles, Patton’s own words leave little ambiguity about whom he believed the U.S. should have viewed as its primary long-term rival: the Soviet Union. Far from referring to Jews or any other domestic group, Patton’s frustration was directed squarely at the USSR and at communism, which he increasingly regarded as the gravest threat facing Europe after the fall of Nazi Germany.

Patton’s private diaries, letters, and conversations from 1945 show a man who, after fighting Hitler’s armies, quickly turned his attention to the Soviet Union’s geopolitical ambitions. He repeatedly warned that Moscow would attempt to dominate Europe and that the Allied victory had unintentionally cleared the way for Soviet expansion. In several candid remarks, he insisted that the Western powers had underestimated the danger presented by Stalin’s regime.

In the closing months of the war, Patton expressed a strong belief that the Red Army was far weaker than it appeared. He claimed the Soviet Air Force had been severely depleted and that their logistical systems were in disarray. After observing Soviet supply lines—often made up of worn wagons pulled by exhausted horses or oxen—Patton argued that the U.S. Army, especially his own Third Army, could defeat the remaining Soviet military presence in a short span of time and with limited losses. He warned that, although such a conflict might be costly, it would be far less disastrous than allowing the USSR to grow stronger in the coming years.

Patton did not hide his conviction that the United States would eventually be forced to confront the Soviets militarily. He predicted that postponing such a clash would only make it bloodier and more difficult. In his view, the balance of power favored the West at the end of 1945, and failing to act decisively would enable the USSR to consolidate its strength.

His disdain for communism also colored his perception of political movements back home. Patton argued—often in sweeping and overheated language—that certain political factions in the United States, whether communist, socialist, or liberal, were inadvertently advancing Soviet interests. These comments reflected the intense anti-communist sentiment of the era, though Patton expressed it in a blunt and undiplomatic style.

One of Patton’s recurring themes was that Germany, despite its crimes and its role in launching the war, should not be left in ruins. He believed that dismantling German society entirely would only leave Western Europe vulnerable to communist influence. Patton feared that a devastated Germany would drift toward the Soviet sphere out of desperation, and he criticized Allied policies that, in his view, increased the likelihood of such an outcome. His desire to use Germany as a buffer against the USSR shaped much of his postwar thinking.

Patton also referenced numerous reports of Soviet atrocities in Berlin, including accounts of mass rape and violent reprisals against civilians. He blamed Allied leaders for not permitting American forces to reach Berlin first, insisting that he could have taken the city and thereby reduced the suffering of its inhabitants. These beliefs deepened his resentment toward the Soviets and reinforced his conviction that they represented a threat not only to Europe but to the moral order of the postwar world.

Conversations with Allied officers, such as General Władysław Anders of the Polish 2nd Corps, further strengthened his views. When Anders remarked that he would struggle to choose between fighting a German or a Soviet force, Patton saw this as confirmation that many Europeans feared the USSR’s intentions as much as, or even more than, the remnants of Hitler’s regime.

The more Patton observed Soviet behavior in occupied territory, the stronger his warnings became. He insisted that the USSR was openly preparing for global dominance and that the Western Allies lacked a unified vision to counter it. To him, the only language Moscow respected was military firmness. If the United States failed to maintain its strength and readiness, he cautioned, the victory over Nazi Germany would ultimately prove hollow.

Understanding the historical context of Patton’s statements is critical: his “wrong enemy” remark was part of a broader postwar anxiety about Soviet expansionism. While Patton’s views were controversial even within the military, they were unmistakably aimed at the USSR—not at Jews or any other group. His fierce anti-communism, distrust of Soviet intentions, and fear of losing the geopolitical advantages gained in 1945 shaped his final months and remain central to interpreting his legacy.