1986: Chin Gigante Tried to Murder John Gotti – John Gotti Laughed then this happened! 

Manhattan, New York. Sparks Steakhouse on East 46th Street. Monday evening, April 14th, 1986. Four months after John Gotti had orchestrated Paul Castalano’s murder on this same sidewalk, four months into Gotti’s reign as boss of the Gambino crime family, four months of consolidating power and demonstrating to the other four New York families that Gotti’s leadership was permanent regardless of whether they’d approved Castellano’s unauthorized removal.

 Four months of Gotti building his reputation as the most visible and most charismatic mob boss in America while simultaneously making enemies among more traditional organized crime figures who viewed Gotti’s methods as reckless and his ambition as threatening to the entire mob structure. At approximately 8:15 p.m., John Gotti exited Spark Steakhouse after dinner with three Gambino Capos, moving toward his Cadillac that was parked at the curb, surrounded by four bodyguards who’d been trained to watch for threats, who understood that their boss had

enemies in multiple crime families, who knew that Gotti’s murder of Castellano without commission approval had created situation where assassination ation attempts were not just possible but likely where other bosses might decide that removing Gotta before he became too powerful was necessary for maintaining traditional mob hierarchy and preventing future unauthorized boss killings.

What Gotti and his bodyguards didn’t know was that Vincent Chin Gigante, boss of the Genevese crime family and arguably the most powerful mob figure in New York, had ordered Gotti’s assassination, had decided that Gotti’s violation of commission rules and his increasingly public profile were threats that needed to be eliminated.

had arranged for two shooters to be positioned near Spark’s steakhouse with instructions to kill Gotti as he left the restaurant to execute him on the same sidewalk where Castellano had died to send message that unauthorized boss killings would be answered with lethal retaliation. The two shooters positioned in a car parked 30 feet from the rest rant entrance.

Waited for Gotti to reach the sidewalk. Waited for clear shot that wouldn’t hit bodyguards or bystanders. Waited for the moment when Gotti was most vulnerable between the restaurant door and his vehicle. At 8:17 p.m., As Gotti walked toward his Cadillac, the shooters exited their car, raised their weapons, 9 millimeter pistols equipped with extended magazines, and began firing, unleashing approximately 18 shots in rapid succession aimed at John Gotti and his bodyguards, creating chaos of gunfire and screaming and people diving for

cover as bullets struck the canewalk and the restaurant windows and Gotti’s Cadillac. But the shooters aim was poor. Compromised by distance and by the ste guards who immediately moved to shield Gotti. Compromised by Gotti’s own reflexes, honed through decades of street violence that made him drop and roll the moment he heard the first shot.

Of the 18 rounds fired, none struck Gotti directly. Two bullets grazed his shoulder, causing minor wounds that bled, but that weren’t life-threatening. One bodyguard was shot in the leg. The Cadillac absorbed multiple rounds, but Gotti survived, remained conscious, immediately understood what had happened and who was likely responsible.

 The shooters fled in their vehicle, disappeared into Manhattan traffic before police arrived, completed their escape, but failed their primary objective. John Gotti was alive, wounded, but functional, angry, but calculating, understanding that this assassination attempt meant war between the Gambino and Genevvesi families, that Chin Gigante had just made a decision that would have consequences extending far beyond this single failed hit.

 Gotti was taken to a hospital, treated for his wounds, which were superficial enough that he was released within 3 hours, returned to his social club in Queens, where his capos had already assembled, where everyone was waiting to see how their boss would respond to attempted murder by another family, whether Gotti would immediately retaliate or whether he’d seek commission mediation or whether he’d accept this as warning and become more cautious about his public appearances and his challenges to traditional mob authority.

At approximately 11:45 p.m. Monday, April 14th, 1986, John Gotti entered the Bergen Hunt and fish club where 15 Gambino capos and approximately 40 soldiers had gathered. where everyone expected to see their boss either furious or shaken, where the atmosphere was tense because assassination attempts meant war and war meant casualties.

And everyone present understood that the next few minutes would determine whether they’d be fighting the Genevvesi family or whether Gotti would find some way to resolve this without fullcale mob warfare that would damage both families and attract federal attention that neither organization wanted.

 John Gotti walked to the center of the room, looked at the assembled mob figures who were waiting for his response, and did something that nobody expected, something that would become legendary in mob circles, something that demonstrated God’s psychological warfare capability and his understanding that perception mattered as much as actual violence in maintaining power and projecting strength. strength.

John Gotti laughed. A loud, genuine laugh that filled the silent room, that showed he found the entire assassination attempt amusing rather than threatening. That demonstrated he viewed Chin Gigante’s murder attempt as failure rather than as serious challenge. that indicated Gotti was confident enough in his own power and his own survival that being shot at was merely entertaining rather than concerning.

“Chinigante tried to kill me tonight,” Gotti announced, his voice carrying throughout the club, making sure everyone heard exactly what he was saying and how he was framing this incident. Two shooters outside Sparks. 18 shots fired. And you know how many hit me? Zero. Well, two grazed me, but but that doesn’t count as actually hitting me.

 18 shots and chin couldn’t even kill me when I was walking in a straight line from a restaurant to my car. That’s the best the Genevese family could do. That’s what the supposedly most powerful mob boss in New York sends to take me out. Two shooters who couldn’t hit a target from 30 ft away. Gotti’s laughter increased, became almost manic, his amusement seeming genuine rather than forced.

 His reaction suggesting that he found the assassination attempt so incompetent that anger would be inappropriate response. You know what this tells me? This tells me that Chin is scared. Chin is so [ __ ] scared of John Gotti that he couldn’t wait, couldn’t plan properly, couldn’t send competent shooters who could actually complete their assignment.

Chin rushed this because he’s terrified that every day I remain alive I get more powerful that every month I’m boss of the Gambinos I become more dangerous as to him and to the other old bosses who think they can control who runs what family and who can be killed without their permission. The room remains silent.

 Everyone processing Gotti’s reaction, understanding that their boss had just framed a serious assassination attempt as evidence of enemy weakness rather than as evidence of serious threat had transformed what should have been frightening incident into demonstration of Gotti’s invulnerability and Chin’s desperation. Here’s what’s going to happen.

 Gotti continued, his voice now becoming more business-like, his laughter fading as he outlined the response that would send message to the Genevese family and to all the other New York families about what happened at when you tried to kill John Gotti and failed. We’re not going to war with the Genevese family. That’s what Chin wants.

 He wants us to retaliate immediately. wants us to start killing his people, wants to create chaos that will give the commission excuse to step in and remove me for starting interf family warfare. We’re not giving him that satisfaction. Gotti walked to a table, sat down, pulled out a cigar, and lit it slowly, using the pause to let everyone understand that his next words would be important, would define how the Gambino family would respond to this attempted murder.

Instead, we’re going to do something that will hurt Chin more than killing his soldiers would hurt him. We’re going to humiliate him. We’re going to make sure everyone in New York, everyone in the commission, everyone in organized crime understands that Chin Jigante tried to kill John Gotti and failed so completely that his target is laughing about it.

We’re going to spread this story. 18 shots, zero hits. Two shooters who couldn’t execute a simple hit on a guy walking from a restaurant to his car. Gotti continued, outlining his strategy with precision that showed this wasn’t emotional response, but calculated psychological warfare.

 Starting tomorrow, every person in our family talks to everyone they know. Talk to the other families. Talk to independent operators. Talk to anyone who will listen. Tell them what happened. Tell them Chin sent shooters who missed 18 times. Tell them John Gotti walked away laughing. Tell them the great Chin Jagante, the supposedly brilliant mob boss who’s been running the Genevese family for years, couldn’t even complete a simple assassination when he had surprise and preparation and competent shooters.

 Well, apparently not competent shooters because competent shooters would have actually hit their [ __ ] target. The strategy was brilliant and devastating. Instead of responding with violence that would trigger mob warfare, Gotti was weaponizing the failed assassination attempt was turning it into propaganda that would damage Chin’s reputation more effectively than killing Genevves soldiers would damage his operations.

In mob culture, where respect and reputation determined power, as much as actual violence did, having a failed assassination attempt become public mockery was catastrophic damage that couldn’t be repaired through retaliation. Over the next week, April 15th through April 21st, 1986, the story of Chin Jigante’s failed attempt to kill John Gotti spread through New York’s organized crime community with extraordinary speed.

Gambino family members told the story to anyone who would listen. The story was embellished. Some versions claimed 20 shots fired. Some claimed Gotti hadn’t even tried to take cover, but had just stood there laughing while bullets missed him. Some claimed Gotti had personally chased the shooters while they fled, but the core narrative remained consistent.

Chin Jigante had tried to murder John Gotti in retaliation for Castellano’s unauthorized killing, had sent shooters to execute Gotti outside Spark’s steakhouse. And the hit had failed so completely that Gotti had walked away with minor wounds and had responded by laughing, by mocking the attempt, by spreading the story as evidence of Genevie’s weakness rather than as evidence that he’d nearly been killed.

The damage to Chin Jigante’s reputation was substantial and immediate. Other mob bosses questioned whether Chin was losing his touch, whether the Genevvesi family’s supposedly superior organizational capability was as strong and people as had believed. whether Chin’s famous strategic thinking extended to planning assassinations or whether he’d rushed this hit without proper preparation because he was genuinely frightened of Gotti’s growing power.

soldiers and associates began questioning whether working for the Genevese family was as desirable as they’d thought. Whether Chin’s leadership was as reliable as his reputation suggested, whether a boss who couldn’t successfully execute John Gotti, despite surprise and preparation, deserved the respect he commanded.

The failed assassination became evidence not of Gotti’s vulnerability, but of Chin’s inability to complete what should have been straightforward hit. Chin Jagante never publicly responded to Gotti’s mockery, never acknowledged the failed assassination attempt, maintained his characteristic silence about family business that had served him well for decades, but that in this case made him appear weak because not defending himself against Gotti’s propaganda allowed the narrative to solidify without competing version of events.

Chin’s silence, which should have been dignified refusal to engage in public disputes, instead appeared to confirm that Gotti’s version was accurate, that the hit had indeed been poorly planned and incompetently executed. The commission met in May 1986 to discuss the situation to determine whether Gotti’s mockery of Chin constituted disrespect that required formal response whether the failed US Assen’s assassination meant that other attempts would follow whether interf family warfare needed to be prevented through mediation.

But the commission’s response was muted, hesitant because Gotti had framed the situation perfectly. He wasn’t the aggressor. Chin had tried to kill him and had failed. And Gotti’s response hadn’t been violence, but had been information warfare that was embarrassing, but that didn’t violate any commission rules about how families could interact.

The commission ultimately decided that no formal action was required. That Chin’s failed assassination attempt was internal matter between Genevves and Gambino families. That Gotti’s propaganda response, while disrespectful, didn’t constitute violence that required commission intervention. This decision essentially validated Gotti’s narrative.

 Gave it official acceptance that the assassination attempt had occurred and had failed. That Gotti’s mockery was understandable response to being targeted for murder. For John Gotti, the April 1986 assassination attempt and his response to it became defining moment in his reign as Gambino boss demonstrated his understanding that psychological warfare could be as effective as violence.

That controlling narrative and reputation could damage enemies more than killing their soldiers could damage their operations. That confidence and humor could transform near-death experience into opportunity to strengthen his position and weaken his opponents. The story became part of Gotti’s legend was retold alongside stories about his generosity and his violence and his charisma provided example of how Gotti thought strategically about power.

 how he used every opportunity to build his reputation and damage his enemy’s reputations. How he understood that in mob culture where respect determined everything, being seen as invulnerable and laughing at assassination attempts was more valuable than any amount of retaliatory violence. For Chin Gigante, the failed assassination attempt damaged his reputation in ways that successful hits never would have enhanced it, created perception that he was losing his strategic capability, that he was making rushed decisions driven by fear rather

than by calculated planning. That the Genevese family’s superiority was less complete than people had believed. Chin remained boss of the Genevese family for another decade. But the failed goddi hit remained a scar on his reputation remained example of miscalculation that had strengthened his enemy rather than eliminating him.

Monday evening, April 14th, 1986, outside Sparks Steakhouse on East 46th Street. The night Chin Jigante sent two shooters to kill John Gotti in retaliation for unauthorized murder of Paul Castellano. 18 shots fired from 30 ft away. Zero fatal hits. two minor wounds that Gotti treated as inconsequential. The assassination attempt that failed so completely that the target responded by laughing, by mocking the shooters incompetence.

By turning neardeath experience into propaganda that damaged the attacker’s reputation, more than successful, hit would have enhanced it. The laughter that responded to murder attempt. The strategy that weaponized failed assassination. The propaganda campaign that spread story of Chin’s incompetence. The reputation damage that couldn’t even be repaired through violence or through silence.

 The commission decision that validated Gotti’s narrative. The legend that became part of Gotti mythology about his invulnerability and his psychological warfare capability. April 14th, 1986. The hit that failed. The boss who laughed. The response that demonstrated that controlling narrative mattered as much as controlling violence. The night when attempted murder became opportunity for psychological warfare that damaged the attacker more than the attack had damaged its target.

 The moment when John Gotti proved that confidence and strategic thinking about reputation could transform assassination attempt into strengthening rather than weakening. Could make enemies look incompetent rather than dangerous. could demonstrate that real power came not just from surviving but from controlling how survival was perceived and discussed throughout organized crime community.

What happened when Chin Jagante tried to murder John Gotti was not immediate retaliation or mob warfare but something more sophisticated and more devastating. Laughter followed by systematic propaganda that turned failed hit into evidence of enemy weakness that damaged Chin’s reputation more effectively than killing Genevie soldiers would have damaged his operations.

that demonstrated Gotti’s understanding that in mob culture, where respect determined power, controlling narrative about attempted murder was more valuable than responding with conventional violence that would have d triggered warfare and commission intervention and federal attention that would have damaged both families equally.