Why Patton Threatened to SHOOT Eisenhower’s British Liaison Officer 

September 17th, 1944 to 14 p.m. Third Army headquarters, Nancy France Majay Richard Thornton Price of the British Army stood at attention in General George Patton’s office, his khaki uniform perfectly pressed, his Sam Brown belt gleaming, his clipboard held at precisely the regulation angle. He was 34 years old, Oxford educated, spoke French and German fluently, and had been personally selected by Field Marshall Montgomery to serve as liaison officer to Patton’s third army with orders to observe operational procedures and

report on logistical capabilities. Within 48 hours, Patton would have his ivory handled Colt 45 pressed against Thornon Price’s forehead, screaming, “Get this British spy out of my headquarters before I forget. We’re allies and blow your goddamn brains all over my map room.” and what triggered that explosion would expose a conspiracy that went all the way to Montgomery’s headquarters and threatened to fracture the entire Allied command structure.

Before we dive into what happened in that room, hit that subscribe button because this is one of the most explosive confrontations of World War II that never made it into the history books the moment Patton discovered the British were sabotaging his fuel supplies and nearly started an international incident by threatening to execute an Allied officer.

 Drop a comment. Would you have kept your cool if you discovered your allies were stabbing you in the back? Or would you have done what Patton did? Let’s get back to September 1944 when the Allied advance was grinding to a halt and nobody could figure out why. By September 1944, Patton’s Third Army had been advancing at a rate that defied military logic.

broken out from Normandy in August, raced 400 m across France, liberated Paris, crossed the Moselle River, and were positioned to drive straight into Germany, and potentially end the war before Christmas. But on September 15th, something changed. Patton’s tanks started running out of fuel, not gradually, but suddenly, catastrophically, as if someone had turned off a tap.

 On September 14th, Third Army received 32,000 gallons of gasoline. On September 15th, they received 7,000 gallons. On September 16th, they received zero and patents. Spearhead units were literally stopping on the roads out of gas, sitting ducks for German counterattacks, while their commander raged at headquarters, demanding to know where his fuel had gone.

 Eisenhower’s official explanation was simple. The Allied supply lines stretched from Normandy beaches to eastern France. Over 400 m of damaged roads and blown bridges, and there simply wasn’t enough fuel to support everyone simultaneously, so priorities had to be set. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was getting priority for Operation Market Gardenda.

 Airborne assault into Holland scheduled for September. The Asia Thee and Patton would have to wait his turn. Conserv will hold his positions until market garden succeeded. But Patton didn’t believe this because his intelligence officers had been tracking Allied fuel shipments and the numbers didn’t add up. Now fuel was arriving at forward depots to support both operations.

 Yet somehow Third Army’s allocation kept shrinking while Montgomery’s kept growing despite Market Garden requiring far less fuel than Patton’s mobile armored operations. This is when Major Thornton Price arrived with his clipboard and his Oxford accent and his orders from Montgomery to observe Third Army operations.

 Patton’s chief of staff, Major General Hobberg, conducted the initial briefing, explaining Third Army’s positions, objectives, and challenges, including the mysterious fuel shortages that were crippling their advance. Thornton Price took notes meticulously, asked probing questions about exact fuel consumption rates, asked about reserve supplies, asked about which units were most affected, and Gay answered because this was a liaison officer from Allied headquarters.

Doing his job, or so they thought, until September 18th when one of Patton’s intelligence officers intercepted something that changed everything. Captain Marcus Henderson was a signals intelligence officer who’d been monitoring German radio traffic, but also unofficially monitoring British communications because Patton didn’t entirely trust the Brits and wanted to know what they were saying when Americans weren’t listening.

On September 18th at 0340 hours, Henderson intercepted and encoded British radio transmission from Third Army headquarters to 21st Army Group headquarters. And when he decoded it using frequencies and codes he wasn’t supposed to have, he found a detailed report from Thornon Price describing Third Army’s exact fuel status, their reserve levels, their daily consumption rates, and a recommendation that Patton’s current fuel stocks are sufficient for defensive operations, but inadequate for offensive operations.

Therefore, diversion of additional fuel allocations to Market Garden will not significantly impact Third Armycapabilities. Henderson took the intercept directly to General Gay at 060 hours and Gay immediately understood what they were looking at. Thornton Price wasn’t just observing, he was spying, gathering intelligence on American fuel supplies and reporting it to Montgomery.

 So Monty could argue that Patton didn’t really need fuel because he supposedly had enough. This was espionage dressed up as liaison work and it explained everything. Montgomery was using Thornton Price to provide ammunition for his arguments to Eisenhower that market Gardens should get priority because Patton’s army was adequately supplied when in reality Patton was running on fumes and the only reason Montgomery knew this was because his spy was sending him American operational data.

 Gabe brought the intercept to Patton at 064 5 hours and according to multiple witnesses present in Patton’s quarters that morning, the general’s reaction was volcanic. read the decoded message three times. His face going from pink to red to purple. And then he said very quietly, “Get Thornton Price to my office in 5 minutes.

” And somebody find my pistols because I’m going to need them. The staff officers present thought he was joking because generals didn’t actually shoot liaison officers even in situations like this. But then Patton opened his foot locker, removed his ivory-handled colt and quarantine sagundos, checked that both were loaded, and strapped on his gun belt with the kind of deliberate calm that suggested he wasn’t joking at all.

 Major Thornton Price arrived at Patton’s office at 065 3 hours, expecting a routine morning briefing, perhaps another round of questions about supply procedures or operational planning. Instead, he found Patton standing behind his desk with both hands resting on his pistol grips. His pale blue eyes fixed on the British officer with an intensity that made Thornton Price freeze in the doorway.

“Come in,” Major Patton said, his voice unnaturally quiet. “And close the door behind you because what I’m about to say needs to stay in this room unless you want the entire Allied command structure to know that the British army employs spies against its own allies.” Thornton Price closed the door, his face going pale as he realized something had gone catastrophically wrong, and Patton slid the decoded intercept across his desk.

“Redit,” Patent commanded. “Read your own words, reporting American operational intelligence to Montgomery. Read your recommendation that fuel be diverted from my army based on false assessments of our capabilities, and then explain to me why I shouldn’t treat you exactly like I’d treat any other enemy spy.

” Caught stealing military secrets. Thornton Price read the intercept, his hands visibly shaking and started to say, “Kenel Patone, I was simply following orders to provide liaison reports. But Patone cut him off by drawing one of his pistols and laying it on the desk with the barrel pointed directly at the British officer.

 Following orders,” Patton repeated, his voice dripping with contempt. “That’s what every spy says when he’s caught. That’s what every traitor claims when he’s exposed. But here’s what your orders have accomplished. My tanks are sitting empty on the roads. Because Montgomery convinced Eisenhower, I don’t need fuel. And Montgomery convinced Eisenhower of this because you’ve been feeding him intelligence about my supply situation that he’s using to argue for priority.

Patton stood up slowly, picked up the pistol, and walked around his desk until he was standing directly in front of Thornton Price. Close enough that when he raised the weapon and pressed it against the British officer’s forehead, there was no possibility of missing. Give me one reason, Patton said, his voice still eerily calm.

 One reason why I shouldn’t blow your British brains all over my map room and tell Eisenhower you pulled a weapon on me. Because who’s he going to believe his most successful field commander or a dead spy? The room was absolutely silent except for Thornton Price’s rapid breathing and the ticking of the clock on Patton’s wall.

And according to Major General Gay, who witnessed the entire confrontation, this went on for approximately 45 seconds. That felt like 45 minutes. Then Patton lowered the pistol, holstered it, and said, “Get out of my headquarters. Get out of France. Get back to Montgomery and tell him that if I ever catch another British liaison officer spying on American operations, I won’t just threaten to shoot a mile.

Actually, do it and deal with the diplomatic consequences afterward.” Thornon Price didn’t salute, didn’t speak, didn’t do anything except turn and leave at something between a fast walk and a run. and within two hours he was on a plane back to 21st Army Group headquarters with a story that would cause an immediate crisis.

 Montgomery’s reaction to Thornon Price’s report was fury at Patton’s theatrics, an outrage that the American general had threateneda British officer, and he immediately sent a formal complaint to Eisenhower demanding Patton be disciplined for conduct unbecoming and threatening Allied personnel. Churchill, when informed of the incident, was equally furious because this played into every British fear about American generals being undisiplined cowboys who couldn’t be trusted to follow protocol.

 But Eisenhower’s reaction surprised everyone because after hearing both sides and reviewing the intercepted transmission, Ike’s response to Montgomery was devastating. If you want me to discipline Patent for threatening your liaison officer, then I’ll need to discipline you for using liazison officers as intelligence assets to undermine Allied operational decisions.

And I don’t think either of us wants that investigation to happen. What Eisenhower had discovered through his own inquiries was that Thornton Price wasn’t an isolated case. Montgomery had been placing liaison officers in multiple American units with explicit orders to report on supply situations so he could use that intelligence to argue for supply priority during the ongoing debate about whether to pursue a broad front strategy.

 Eisenhower’s preference supporting both British and American advances or a narrow front strategy. Montgomery’s preference concentrating resources on his northern thrust. These leazison officers were essentially conducting economic espionage against Allied partners, gathering data about American capabilities and using it to argue Americans didn’t need resources that Montgomery wanted.

 And Patton had simply been the first American commander to catch one and call it what it was. The confrontation forced Eisenhower into an impossible position. He couldn’t publicly acknowledge that the British had been spying on American units because that would destroy Allied unity and give the Germans propaganda ammunition about Allied divisions.

 But he also couldn’t punish Patton for threatening Thornton Price because Patton had been right to be furious about the even if his method of expressing that fury was wildly inappropriate. Eisenhower’s solution was to quietly remove all British liaison officers from American units. replace them with American liaison officers at British units who were explicitly forbidden from intelligence gathering and to issue a directive that all supply allocation decisions would be made at SHAF level based on operational requirements rather than intelligence

reports from liaison officers. Montgomery never publicly apologized, but did send a private letter to Patton that was less apology than explanation, arguing that liaison reports were standard practice and that operational transparency benefits the alliance and that perhaps sensitivities were heightened by the stress of operations.

Patton’s response preserved in his personal papers was brief and colorful. Montgomery, your leazison officer was a spy. Your transparency was theft. And your sensitivities comment suggests you still don’t understand that I was seconds away from actually shooting the son of Fabi. And next time, I won’t stop at threats.

The two generals relationship, already strained by personality conflicts and strategic disagreements, never recovered from the Thornprice incident, and their mutual contempt would continue to complicate Allied operations for the rest of the war. The broader impact of the incident was significant because it exposed how competition for resources was creating espionage-like behavior between allied partners who were supposed to be cooperating.

 Montgomery genuinely believed that concentrating resources on his northern thrust offered the best chance to end the war quickly. And from his perspective, gathering intelligence about American supply situations to support his arguments was simply smart planning. But from Patton’s perspective and from the perspective of American commanders generally, Montgomery was using espionage to steal resources from Americans who were advancing faster and more successfully than the British.

 And the fact that this was being done through liaison officers rather than admitted spies made it more insulting rather than less. The fuel situation that triggered the entire crisis never fully resolved because Market Garden failed catastrophically in late September 1944. Proving that Montgomery strategy had been flawed regardless of how many resources he diverted to it, Patton’s third army remained fuel starved through October and November 1944.

 Unable to exploit opportunities that might have shortened the war. And when the Germans launched their surprise offensive through the Arden in December, the Battle of the Bulge, many historians have argued that if Patton had been adequately supplied in September and October, his forces might have been positioned to prevent or blunt that attack.

 The question of whether Montgomery’s resource prioritization cost the Allies months of war and thousands of lives remains debated, but what’s undeniable is thatthe spy scandal exposed deep rifts in Allied command that never fully healed. Major Richad Fontton Price survived the war, returned to Britain and never spoke publicly about the incident with Patton’s official military records.

Simply note that he was reassigned from liaison duties in September 1944 with no explanation of why. Patton never faced discipline for threatening him because Eisenhower quietly buried the entire incident, deciding that preserving Allied unity required pretending it never happened even as he implemented changes to prevent recurrence.

 The intercepted transmission that started everything was classified and remained so until the 1990s when it was finally declassified and confirmed the story that Patton’s staff had been telling privately for decades. The story of why Patton threatened to shoot Eisenhau’s British liaison officer is really a story about trust or the lack thereof in coalition warfare where allies pursue both common goals and competing interests.

 Montgomery wasn’t wrong that market garden needed resources. And Patton wasn’t wrong that Third Army was achieving better results per gallon of fuel consumed. And Eisenhower wasn’t wrong that he had to balance competing demands from commanders who both had valid arguments. But what made the situation toxic was the espionage aspect of Montgomery had openly argued, I need Patton’s fuel because my operation has higher priority.

 That would have been acceptable strategic debate, but instead he used covert intelligence gathering to undermine Patton’s arguments. And when that was discovered, it transformed strategic disagreement into something that looked like betrayal. If this story of espionage, conspiracy, and patently shooting an Allied officer made you see World War II differently, hit that subscribe button and notification bell because we’re uncovering the stories that complicate the simple narratives.

The moments when allies spied on each other, when generals threatened to kill people on their own side, when the real enemies were sometimes the bureaucrats and schemers in your own command structure. Drop a comment. Was Montgomery justified in using liaison officers to gather intelligence on American supply situations? Or was Patton right to call it espion? And the bigger question, if you were Eisenhower, how would you have handled a situation where your best two field commanders were literally pointing guns at each

other’s representatives while Germany was still fighting?