Horrific Freefall into the Deepest Ocean | The Sad Story of Flight 447

what’s happening I don’t know what’s
happening we’re losing control of the
aircraft here we lost all control of the
aircraft what you’re witnessing is the
beginning of one of aviation’s greatest
Mysteries a top-notch aircraft an
experienced crew and a sudden terrifying
descent into the
unknown this is the story of Air France
flight 447
[Music]

Warning & Disclaimer

on May 31st 2009 around 8:00 p.m. local
time Air France flight 447 was pushed
back from the gate at Rio de Janeiro
International Airport in Brazil with

Background

destination Paris
France the route from Rio de Janeiro to
Paris crosses the Atlantic Ocean
starting in Brazil it travels over the
northern Atlantic approaching the
mainland of Europe before landing in
Paris this flight typically takes about
12
hours the aircraft involved was an
Airbus A330 2000 the newest in air
France’s Fleet it underwent a major
overhaul in April 2009 and had
accumulated about 19,000 flying hours at
the time of the
incident two General Electric CF6
engines powered the aircraft with no
documented issues on board were 216
passengers of nearly 30
nationalities the majority of passengers
were French Brazilian or German citizens
the passengers included business and
holiday
Travelers this aircraft is designed for
two pilots however the 13-hour Duty time
for the Rio to Paris route exceeds the
10 hours permitted before a break is
required according to air France’s
procedures this Duty time includes
flight duration and pre-flight
preparation to comply flight 447 was
crewed by three
Pilots the captain 58-year-old Mark Duo
he had almost 11,000 flying hours of

which more than 6,000 were as a captain
including 1,700 hours on the Airbus

Crew

A330 the relief first officer co-pilot
in the left seat 37-year-old David robar
he had more than 6,000 flying hours
4,500 hours were on this specific
aircraft type and the first officer the
co-pilot in the right seat was
32-year-old Pierre Cedric Bona he had
almost 3,000 flight hours with 87 of
those hours on this aircraft type
at Half 8 local time the Airbus took off
the takeoff proceeded normally as
expected for a fully loaded aircraft
following the standard protocols for
their climb and setting the course for
their transatlantic

Take off

Journey conforming to air France’s
standard procedures around 20,000 ft the
relief first officer left the cockpit to
begin his 3-hour rest
period the captain took over the left
seat while the the first officer
occupied the right seat a few moments
later the flight reached its cruising
altitude of flight level
35 the first couple of hours of the
flight were largely routine and
uneventful at 1:35 a.m. the flight
entered Oceanic airspace over the

Cruise

Atlantic Ocean Northeast of the South
American
continent during that time of year the
Mid-Atlantic region was known for its
typical weather patterns characterized
by a broad band of thunderstorms
stretching across the intertropical
Convergence
Zone this region is a band of low
pressure around the earth that generally
lies near the equator the Trade Winds of
the northern and southern hemispheres
come together here leading to frequent

Intertropical Convergence Zone

thunderstorms and heavy
rain flying through this area is often
challenging for Pilots because the
thunderstorms don’t appear well on radar
additional
these storms don’t have as much
lightning as storms in other places
which can make them seem less severe
than they are especially at night while
the aircraft’s automated systems manage
the flight a primary responsibility of
the cockpit crew involves overseeing the
flight’s progress using the onboard
weather radar to avoid areas of
significant
turbulence Air France flight 447
encountered an area of tropical showers
and weak thunderstorms characterized by
weak to moderate updrafts and a high
likelihood of turbulence the crew
discussed their desire to climb to
flight level

Flying through an area of weak thunderstorms/turbulence

370 to ascend above the
weather but they found it too warm to
climb to that altitude warm air is
thinner reducing the lift the plane can
generate which is crucial for
maintaining flight the crew dimmed the
cockpit lights and turned on the landing
lights to see
outside it looks like we’re entering the
cloud cover it would have been good to
climb now it’s going to be turbulent for
my
rest at 2:00 a.m. the relief first
officer returned from his rest break the
captain left for his without providing a
proper briefing consequently the first
officer now the pilot flying in the
right seat and the designated pilot in
command in the captain’s absence
informed the relief first officer about
the inability AB ility to climb and
anticipated turbulence ahead similar to
recent
[Music]
encounters 6 minutes later the two first
officers notified the cabin crew of the
upcoming turbulence expected in 2
minutes the turbulence ahead turned out
to be moderate despite having the
autopilot engaged the bank angle
fluctuated between roughly 3° to the
right and 5° to the left the first
officer adjusted the radar gain setting
to increase its sensitivity and
suggested a deviation to the left they
turned the aircraft 12° left of the
intended track to avoid the worst of the
weather 2 minutes later the aircraft
encountered an updraft a sound typical
of ice crystals hitting the fuselage was
heard the Pito tubes started picking up
ice particles normally this would not be
a problem but if the concentration of

Pitot tubes start picking up Ice particles

crystals is high high enough they can
clog them faster than the built-in
heaters can melt them the A330 has three
PTO tubes one each for the captain the
first officer and the standby
instruments each PTO tube measures the
pressure of the oncoming air which is

Stall Explanation

the first officer struggled to regain
control over the bank angle and
overcontrolled the roll input with the
series of left and right Banks the
control inputs were exactly out of phase
with the roll motion after a challenging

Struggling to gain control

period he gradually managed to stabilize
the roll over the next 30 seconds which
silenced the stall warning just seconds
later the air speed indicated on the
standby instrument began to Decay once
more dropping Sharp ly from 270 to 73
knots the aircraft’s pitch increased by
11° and its vertical speed increased
through 6,000 ft per minute the first
officer continued to make nose up inputs
and the pitch attitude increased to
16° a series of small roll movements
began he counted each with lateral stick
input the stall warning was triggered
again and amidst the chaos attempts were
made to call the captain back by ringing
a call chime in the crew rest area the
stall angle of attack was reached
causing the aircraft to shake as it
entered an aerodynamically unstable
condition thrust was increased to toer
the first officer continued to make nose
up inputs resulting in the aircraft
maintaining a shallow climb above all
try to touch the lateral controls as
little as possible the rolling continued
and the first officer inputs increased
using up to full left and right stick
inputs to counteract them the ice
blocking the Pito tubes had melted and
all three air speed indicators displayed
the correct readings of around 180 knots
it became clear that they were flying
too slowly for this flight level as the
normal air speed for their flying
altitude was about 260 knots seconds
later the aircraft reached its maximum
altitude of almost 38,000 ft it had
gained 3,000 ft in just 1 minute and 7
Seconds since the autopilot disconnected
the bank angle increased to the right

Maximum altitude reached

the first officer held full left stick
with virtually no effect on the bank
angle I don’t have control of the
aircraft anymore I don’t have control of
the aircraft at all controls to the

Freefall

left the relief first officer made two
full left control inputs the first
officer kept his control stick fully to
the left and pulled it all the way back
for nearly 40 seconds The Descent rate
increased to 10,000 ft per minute the
pitch attitude fluctuated between about
10° and 16° nose up 2 minutes after the
autopilot disconnected the captain
entered the cockpit the indicated air
speeds dropped below 60 knots which made
the angle of attack sensors invalid and
silenced the stall warning as the speeds
fell below 30 knots a red SPD flag
replaced the air speed indication
despite the first officer his side stick
being full left in an attempt to control
it the aircraft was tilted to the right
with bank angles fluctuating up to
45° what are you doing what’s happening
I don’t know what’s happening we’re
losing control of the aircraft here we
lost all control of the aircraft the
pitch attitude pposed from 8° to 15°
nose up the thrust levers were moved to
idle and the nose pitched down each time
the nose pitched down the angle of
attack reduced slightly the air speed
indication reappeared and the stall
warning
reactivated I have the impression that
we have some crazy speed the first
officer deployed the speed brakes
causing the nose to pitch up level with
the Horizon the relief first officer
told him not to extend the speed brakes
and they were retracted as a result the
nose returned to 8° below the Horizon
before before pitching up again the
aircraft continued to descend with
vertical speeds between 10,000 and
15,000 ft per minute the thrust levers
were moved to the climb power setting
and for the first time in a minute the
aircraft’s wings briefly became level
indicating a straight flight path
however this was only temporary as the
aircraft continued to sway left and
right prompting the first officer to
make significant movements with the side
stick to counteract each roll movement
and stabilize the aircraft as the
aircraft descended through 20,000 ft the
thrust levers were moved from the climb
detent to toga shortly after the
aircraft began to roll to the right full
left side stick input was applied once
again and held steady for 20
seconds we’re there we’re there we’re
passing level 100 they had already
descended 28,000 ft at that that time
wait I have I have the controls the
relief first officer made a left input
for about 7 seconds but the first
officer never released his side stick F
input what is how come we’re continuing
to go down inut the relief first officer
instructed the captain to see if a reset
of the flight control computers could
help the captain remarked that it would
not do anything but he reset primary and
secondary flight control computers
anyway 9,000 ft climb climb climb climb
I’ve been at Max’s nose up for a while
no no no don’t climb so go down the
relief first officer pushed his own
stick forward while the thrust levers
were pulled back to climb power the
first officer however continued to pull
back and dual input sounded again me the
controls the controls to me controls to
me go ahead you have the controls the
relief first officer lowered the nose to
7° below the Horizon the air speeds and
stall warning were displayed once more 7
seconds later despite the relief first
officer saying he had the controls the
first officer began to pull back on the
side stick again dual input was
announced and the aircraft started to
pitch up dual input watch out up I’m
pitching up I’m pitching up the thrust
levers were pulled back to idle for 2
seconds and the nose pitched up to 16°
you’re pitching up well we need to we
are at 4,000 ft seconds later as the
aircraft reached 2500 ft the ground
proximity warning sounded in the cockpit
go on pull pull up pull up pull up the
thrust LS were moved to toga and both
Pilots applied a nose up command as the

Crash

aircraft pitched up towards 16 Dees
again then the first officer pushed the
Takeover button on his side stick
cutting out the relief first officer’s
commands we’re going to crash this can’t
be
true
the aircraft dropped from 38,000 ft to
sea level in just 3 minutes and 30
seconds tragically all passengers and
crew on board lost their lives making it
one of the most tragic days in aviation
history let us take a moment to reflect
on the profound impact of this event and
remember those who were lost before we
continue with the investigation

In Memory of the 228 lives lost

part shortly after 4 in the morning when
the flight had failed to contact Air
Traffic Control in either Sagal or Cape
Verde the controller in Sagal attempted
to contact the aircraft despite his

Rescue Operation

attempts he received no response Brazil
and Sagal alerted Rescue Services
initiating the search for the aircraft
however the challenge was that Air
France flight 447 had seemingly
disappeared in a region lacking radar
coverage with no possibility of
witnesses and with inconsistent radio
communication 2 Days Later a Brazil ion
planes spotted what appeared to be an
oil slick and light floating debris a
couple of days afterward search teams
discovered two bodies along with
personal belongings the final resting
place of flight 447 was discovered on
April 3r 2011 at a depth of almost 4,000
M by May 10th both black boxes had been
found and were sent for analysis by the
Bea France’s air safety agency in July
2012 the Bea published the final report
on this accident the investigation
unveiled a temporary discrepancy in the
measured speeds likely triggered by the
obstruction of the Pito probes due to

Final Report

ice crystals as a result the autopilot
disconnected and the flight control mode
transitioned to alternate law this
action deactivated several built-in
protections such as angle of attack
overs speed and Bank angle protection
consequently the aircraft became more
responsive to roll inputs as outlined in
the associated procedure the pilots were
expected to swiftly diagnose and address
the issue with preventive measures on
Pitch attitude and thrust however the
failure unexpectedly occurred during
Cruise flight surprising the pilots this
resulted in excessive roll handling
inputs and a sudden nose-up maneuver the
aircraft entered a sustained stall
indicated by the stall warning and
strong Buffet the stall warning and the
buffeting were not identified even after
having sounded continuously for 54
seconds the crew never attempted a
recovery maneuver to exit the stall
ultimately leading to the crashing into
the ocean the fact that they never made
a recovery maneuver was likely a result
of a lack of specific training although
it met regulatory standards manual
aircraft handling cannot be improvised
it necessitates precise and measured
inputs on the flight
controls examination of their last
training records and check rides made it
clear that the co-pilots had not been
trained for manual aircraft handling of
approach to stall and stall recovery at
high altitude on the basis of the
findings from the investigation the Bea
issued several recommendations including
the following reviewing check and
training programs to ensure they include
mandatory
exercises focus on setting up specific
and regular drills for manual aircraft
handling during stall approaches and
recovery even at high altitude
furthermore aircrafts undertaking public
transport flights with passengers must
be equipped with an image recorder that
allows for observation of the entire
instrument panel in addition several
other recommendations were proposed such
as suggestions for the flight recorders
the P to probes better task sharing in
case of augmented Crews and the
installation of an angle of attack
indicator in conclusion it is evident
that no single interpretation fully
explains the actions of the crew in the
meantime it would be beneficial even for
non-pilots to reflect on the events of
Air France flight
447 let’s prioritize learning from
others to ensure safer skies for
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